by Jim Mellen >>>
The typical Cuban soldier was a poor peasant from the rural districts. He fought because he had no job and little food, and because all attempts to bring social reforms to the island had failed. Afro-Cuban Esteban Montejo, who fought in the war, attributed the main cause of the war to inequality of opportunity in Cuba:
The war was necessary. It wasn't fair that so many jobs and so many privileges happened to fall into the hands of the Spaniards alone. It wasn't fair that for women to work they had to be daughters of Spaniards. None of that was fair. You never saw a black lawyer because they said that blacks were only good for the forest. You never saw a black teacher. It was all for the white Spaniards. Even the white criollos were pushed aside. I seen that myself. A night watchman, whose only job was to walk around, call out the hour, and put out the candle, had to be a Spaniard. And everything was like that. There was no freedom. That's why a war was necessary. 1
A letter from T. Estrada Palma, a Cuban in exile in the United States, demonstrates a similar sentiment. Presented to the U.S. Senate on February 28, 1896, by Senator John Sherman of Ohio, it reads:
No public schools are within reach of the masses for their education. All of the principle industries of the island are hampered by excessive imports.
The Cubans have no security of person or property. The judiciary are instruments of the military authorities. Trial by military tribunals can be ordered at any time at the will of the captain-general. There is, besides, no freedom of speech, press, or religion. In point of fact, the causes of the revolution of 1775 were not nearly as grave as those that have driven the Cuban people to the various insurrections which culminated in the present revolution. 2
In other words, the Cubans fought for individual liberty, and not just freedom from their colonizer.
Afro-Cubans made up the bulk of the independence forces. Arguably the greatest general of the war, Antonio "The Bronze Titan" Maceo, was of mixed African and Spanish heritage. In 1912 the Cuban Partido Independiente de Color claimed that Afro-Cubans composed 85 percent of the insurgents' fighting forces. 3
In the century after the American Revolution, many fighting forces took to using guerrilla warfare as a tactic. Spanish forces fighting Napoleon's brother in Spain at the beginning of the 19th century first coined the term guerrilla. Cuban soldiers mastered the art of guerrilla warfare during their war with Spain. Their fighting tactics consisted largely of charges, often on horseback, to fight with machetes and bayonets against Spanish soldiers with superior equipment and more of it. This hand-to-hand type of attack also frightened the Spanish troops a great deal. "An intelligent and reliable American" wrote a letter to Consul General Williams in July 1895 stating that, while a captive of the rebels, he was told that "they had plenty ammunition, but did not need any, they shoot only if attacked and then their sharpshooters only, the balance hold power with their machetes." 4 Esteban Montejo confirmed the fear of machetes, stating that "the Spaniards . . . weren't afraid of rifles but machetes, yes." 5
The Cuban generals proved to be superior tacticians when compared to the Spanish. For example, at the battle of Peralejo, northeast of Santiago de Cuba, in mid-July 1895, Antonio Maceo, after being surprised by a force commanded by Spanish general-in-chief, Martínez Campo, rallied his troops with a series of horseback charges. He then organized his infantry on each side of the Spanish to lay down a devastating crossfire. The Spanish forces escaped complete destruction largely because the rebels ran out of ammunition. 6 The Cubans typically used guerrilla tactics because they were nearly always outnumbered and were always short of ammunition and weapons.
Disease also demoralized and weakened the Spanish army. Historians estimate that ten Spaniards died from disease to every one killed by insurgents. Gómez recognized this and, when asked for a list of his best generals, replied, "June, July and August." 7 The Americans also felt the sting of disease during the few months in 1898 when they fought in the war. William S. Miller, a soldier in the 3rd United States Infantry, wrote his sister Alice Miller, "There is from ten to twenty that die [of malaria] every day." 8
In February 1896 Spanish General Velariano Weyler replaced Campos, who had been consistently defeated by Cuban forces. Weyler had received the nickname of "Butcher" during the Ten Years' War. U.S. newspapers and Cuban propaganda quickly latched on to this nickname and blew his previous atrocities out of proportion. However, in late 1896, Weyler lived up to his nickname when he issued the reconcentrado order. This commanded all rural Cubans to relocate into camps in the cities. He also ordered immediate execution of any Cuban suspected of aiding the rebels. Weyler clearly intended to eliminate the Cuban insurgents' base of support. The Spanish exhibited special brutality against the families of known insurgents. Weyler believed this would demoralize the Cuban army. These concentration camps held thousands of Cubans in crowded, dirty conditions, resulting in the rapid spread of disease. Thousands of Cubans died in these camps. The number of those who died is difficult to determine. However, the 1887 census showed 1,631,687 Cubans, with a decrease to 1,572,797 people in the 1899 census. Based on the population growth rate previous to these dates, it is reasonable to assume that there would have been at least 1.8 million people in Cuba by 1899 without the war. 9 According to Cuban figures only 8,617 insurgents died (of both disease and combat wounds). 10
A militia also formed in Cuba from among the Spanish young. They became known as the Volunteers and gained renown for atrocities committed. U.S. Consul-General Fitzhugh Lee wrote of them:
The lower classes of the Havana male population—porters, draymen, and clerks—are organized into a dangerous and oftentimes uncontrollable military force, known as the Volunteers, who, while never having been known to take the field, are a serious menace to the peace of the city, being equally feared by the authorities, over whose heads they wave the threat of mutiny, especially on indication of granting reforms, and by the resident and unarmed Cubans, over whom they hold the threat of massacre. Up to date the record of the organized mob has been a series of horrible crimes, such as shooting down a crowd of peaceable citizens as they emerged from the theater, firing into the office and dining room of a hotel, assaulting the residences of Cuban gentlemen, and in 1871 forcing the authorities to execute forty-three medical students, all boys under twenty, because one of them had been accused of scratching the glass plate on a vault containing the remains of a volunteer. Fifteen thousand volunteers witnessed with exultation this ignoble execution. 11
Lee does not say it, but the Volunteers consisted of Spanish-born males living in Havana. These men rejected reform because their jobs depended on their Spanish birth. The oppressiveness of the Spanish was well known in the United States. For example, congressmen made numerous statements like: "the entire population [of Cuba], with the exception of the official class, was living under a tyranny unparalleled at this day on the globe." 12 Senator Morgan added:
A firm declaration that the conflict in Cuba had reached the stage of open public war would have admonished Spain that the United States at least would hold her and the Cubans to obedience to the laws of civilized warfare, and the world would have been spared the spectacle of the utter ruin of an adjoining country, by nature one of the most charming and fertile in the world. 13
When the United States invaded Cuba, it did so without allying with the Cubans. The U.S. propaganda machine turned out stories of the Americans going to rescue the Cubans. In truth, the Cubans did not need saving; already they had nearly won the conflict. The U.S. government proceeded without regard for Cuban interests. The United States pursued such tactics because if it had allied with the Cubans, the United States would have been forced to give diplomatic recognition to Cuba. The U.S. Congress voted April 25, 1898, that a state of war had existed between the United States and Spain since April 21.
During the congressional hearings over entrance into the war, the U.S. Senate passed the following resolutions:
First. That the people of the Island of Cuba are, and of a right ought to be free and independent and that the Government of the United States hereby recognizes the Republic of Cuba as the true and lawful Government of that Island.
Fourth. That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition of intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or control over said island except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination when that is accomplished to leave the government and control of the island to its people. 14
President McKinley threatened to veto these resolutions. In response, Congress compromised and eliminated recognition of the Cuban government, leaving that "the people of the Island of Cuba are, and of a right ought to be free and independent." McKinley stated that he did not want to recognize the Cuban government because:
To commit this country now to the recognition of any particular government in Cuba may subject us to embarrassing conditions of international obligations towards the organization so recognized. In case of intervention our conduct would be subject to the approval or disapproval of such government. We would be required to submit to its direction and to assume to it the mere relation of a friendly ally. 15
Thus, distinct from the respect shown by the French toward the American colonies in the American Revolution, U.S. officials resolved to intervene without recognizing or respecting the sovereignty of the Cuban government. Clearly, McKinley and the U.S. government created conditions whereby they would be able to control any government in Cuba through the "obligation" to ensure that Cuba was provided with a decent government. In public and congressional debates that ensued, it was clear that the opposition understood McKinley's desires. Senator Butler asserted, "If I can understand the message it means that the President is opposed to Cuban independence now and forever." 16
The United States quickly blockaded Cuba after the declaration of war. It took longer to organize the troops to be sent for a landing. In June the U.S. forces landed. Coordinating with Cuban General Calixto García, they began their assault on Santiago de Cuba.
Accounts of the battle at Santiago de Cuba vary widely. The U.S. commanders completely denigrated the usefulness of the Cuban troops. Theodore Roosevelt said of them,
The Cuban soldiers were almost all blacks and mulattoes and were clothed in rags and armed with every kind of old rifle. They were utterly unable to make a serious fight, or to stand against even a very inferior number of Spanish troops, but we hoped they might be of some use as scouts and skirmishers. For various reasons this proved not to be the case, and so far as the Santiago Campaign was concerned, we should have been better off if there had not been a single Cuban with the army. They accomplished literally nothing, while they were a source of trouble and embarrassment, and consumed much provisions. 17
Soon after stating this, Roosevelt described the landing of U.S. troops at the Harbor of Ponce, approximately 15 miles from Santiago de Cuba. 18 Nearly every participant in the disembarkment except Roosevelt praised the insurgents' aid in defending the landing spot from Spanish troops. A Spanish general, a newspaper correspondent with the expedition, and Cuban commander General García all asserted that the Cubans enabled the American troops to land due to their valor in attacking Spanish forces that were approaching to impede the Americans' landing. 19
Roosevelt's account was part of a systematic campaign to denigrate the Cuban armies of liberation. War correspondents wrote nastily of the Cuban soldiers. A typical article by a correspondent with the American army noted,
On the way we met several groups of Cubans. I don't know what they are called—'insurgents,' 'patriots,' 'soldiers,' or what. All names are alike to me. . . . It seems strange that not one [Cuban] was ever seen to be guilty of an act which was not selfish—and often criminal. However, they made a terrible bluff. Every day, during the week preceding the battle of July 1st, the main thoroughfare was the scene of many brave Cubans going to the front. After much hullabaloo they would march up and down, and then vanish from one end of the village or the other—on their way to battle. What they battled for was with each other—for food. They invariably went a short distance out of town, then turned 'into camp' behind a heavy hedge by the roadside. The greatest of these was Bigaro Chavaville, who commanded 200 men. He was a worker. At various times during the day he would go dashing through the crowds at Siboney, up to the 'Cuban headquarters.' Here he would obtain grave information, and then dash off into the mountains. But he would only dash a few hundred yards, and then he would go into camp and await the time for a reappearance. If he ever received any information other than the fact that General Castillo and his brother, Doctor Castillo—who seemed to be running things to suit themselves—were eating and drinking, I've never heard what it was. Judging from the little I saw of Cuban officers, I would like to know the address of a single one who would bind himself not to accept a political office for a term of five years. From the highest officer to the lowliest 'soldier,' they were there for personal gain. On the way to the front that morning I met several Cuban groups. The first encountered had been nowhere near the battlefield. They had been 'in camp.' After a good mile's tramp, I met the first of several bands of thieves. Possibly thirty were in this party. Every single one of them had from one to three or four pieces of clothing, blankets, or tents which they had picked up on the roadside, where they had been thrown by the mend of the '1st' and '10th' while on their forced march. They were all chattering and grinning. 20
To this scathing indictment of the Cubans, William Hilary Coston, who had fought with the American volunteers in Cuba, responded,
What [the newspaper correspondents] considered cowardly may be owing to the different methods of fighting employed by the two armies. One fact is most prominent: They had practically won their own freedom when our rescuing army invaded the then territory of Spain, to secure the Cubans liberty and the right to pursue happiness. If they are the cowards that our newspapermen represent them, their accomplishments, while at war with their enemies, prove an unsolvable mystery. It is fair to say that no other nation of "cowards," with larger resources and greater aid from sympathizing nations, have ever accomplished what they did. 21
The military and the newspapers denigrated the Cubans because they wished to justify to the American people why the United States should control the Cuban government. Although U.S. officials decided not to annex Cuba, the United States controlled Cuba indirectly for over 60 years after the war. The Cubans gained some measure of independence only when Castro continued the Cuban Revolution and they at last gained some measure of independence.
Many U.S. soldiers also criticized the Cuban soldiers. Such attitudes surfaced because the Cuban army was composed mainly of Afro-Cuban troops, who were largely emaciated and whose clothing was torn and ragged. The Richmond Planet summarized the views of many American soldiers in Cuba: "[The Cubans] were described as a lazy, thieving, plundering, worthless, murdering mob who needed to be kept down with a strong hand." 22 The Reverend H.C.C. Astwood explained why American soldiers' opinions about Cubans changed from thinking they were patriots to the highly critical view they ended the war with: "It has been found out at last, as I used to tell them in the United States, the majority of Cubans were negroes; now that this fact has dawned upon the white brother, there is no longer a desire to have Cuban independence." 23 Coston, an African-American, disagreed with the typical description of the Cuban people:
I have found [the Cubans], fortunately with hardly an exception, honorable, grateful, though in the most abjectly impoverished condition. True, I have found no one who has intimated a desire to prostrate himself before an American, nor any who has offered to kiss his hand. . . . No monument of stone or of gold can display the quality of their courage. . . . The pain of hunger, the shame of nudity, and the want of shelter, have failed to cause them to prostitute themselves. 24
Charles Johnson Post, a private with the American army, was also impressed with the Cubans, even though they did not necessarily carry their rifles in the same way and look neat and orderly. "The War correspondents sneered at these Cubans and ridiculed their rags, their rifles, and their fighting! The correspondents knew nothing of it." 25 He went on to state, "Barefoot, or only in rawhide sandals, they could outmarch any of the professional armies. I have seen them, and side by side with our column when they had to make time. They swung along in single file over the narrow trail, in an easy stride that had the suggestion of a lope in it." 26
In contrast to American armies in their own Revolutionary War, the Cuban insurgents probably could have won their freedom without foreign aid. 27 Esteban Montejo supports this view in Biography of a Runaway Slave: "The story of the American intervention in Santiago de Cuba was poppycock—[the U.S. military] couldn't have taken the town by themselves." 28 Congressmen were also aware of the fact that Spain could not subjugate the Cuban rebels. Senator Vest stated in February, 1896, "[I] believe the attempt of the monarchy of Spain to suppress this endeavor to form a Republic on the Island of Cuba, is absolutely hopeless." 29 Such perceptions spurred U.S. Congressional representatives in their demand for American intervention. These men believed that if the Cubans successfully defeated the Spanish without U.S. aid, imposition of neo-colonial control by the United States on Cuba would be made more difficult.
1 Miguel Barnet, Biography of a Runaway Slave, trans. W. Nick Hill (Willimantic, CT: Curbstone Press, 1994), 153.
2 Quote of a letter from T. Estrada Palma read before the Senate by Senator John Sherman of Ohio, Congressional Record, 54th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 28, pt. 3, February 28, 1896, 2244.
3 Hugh Thomas, Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1971), 514.
4 Letter from an unnamed American to Ramon Williams and sent to Asst. Secretary of State Edwin Uhl, Havana, August 15, 1895, USNA, Consular Despatches from Cuba, T-20:121. Most likely they did not have ammunition; the Cuban rebels commonly tried to overstate their supplies to the world at large, hoping to gain recognition of belligerency.
5 Barnet, Biography of a Runaway Slave, 161.
6 Foner, Antonio Maceo, 186-86.
7 Gómez in Foner, Antonio Maceo, 174.
8 William S. Miller, Cuba, to Alice Miller, Lakefield, Minnesota, 29 July, 1898, Special Collections, University of Idaho, Moscow.
9 Susan Schroeder, Cuba: A Handbook of Historical Statistics (Boston: G. K. Hall and Company, 1982), 41.
10 Foner, Antonio Maceo, 174.
11 Fitzhugh Lee, Joseph Wheeler, Theodore Roosevelt, and Richard Wainright, Cuba's Struggle Against Spain with the Causes for American Intervention and a Full Account of the Spanish-American War, including Final Peace Negotiations (New York, The American Historical Press, 1899), 78.
12 From the minority opinion of the Committee on Foreign Relations read by the Senate secretary, Congressional Record, 54th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 28, pt. 2, February 20, 1896, 1068.
13 Senator John Morgan of Alabama, Congressional Record, 54th Cong., 2nd sess.,Vol. 29, pt. 1, December 15 1896, 163.
14 Congressional Record, 55th Cong., 2nd sess., Vol. 31, pt. 4, April 16, 1898, 3993.
15 Ronald Fernandez, Cruising the Caribbean: U.S. Influence and Intervention in the Twentieth Century (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 1994), 11.
16 Foner, The Spanish-Cuban-American War, 265.
17 Fitzhugh Lee, Joseph Wheeler, Theodore Roosevelt, and Richard Wainright, Cuba's Struggle Against Spain with the Causes for American Intervention and a Full Account of the Spanish-American War, including Final Peace Negotiations (New York, The American Historical Press, 1899), 645.
18 Lee et al., Cuba's Struggle Against Spain, 645-46.
19 Foner, The Spanish-Cuban-American War, Vol. II, 354.
20 A war correspondent quoted in William Hilary Coston, The Spanish-American War Volunteer (Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Library Presses, 1971), 172-73.
21 Coston, The Spanish-American War Volunteer, 173.
22 The Richmond Planet, quoted in George P. Marks, The Black Press (New York: Arno Press, 1971), 81.
23 The Cleveland Gazette, quoted in Marks, The Black Press, 89.
24 Coston, The Spanish-American War Volunteer, 166.
25 Charles Johnson Post, The Little War of Private Post (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1960), 127.
26 Post, The Little War of Private Post, 127.
27 Philip Brenner, From Confrontation to Negotiation: U.S. Relations with Cuba (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), 6.
28 Miguel Barnet, Biography of a Runaway Slave, trans. W. Nick Hill (Willimantic, CT: Curbstone Press, 1994), 196.
29 Congressional Record, 54th Cong., 1st sess., 1896, 28, pt. 3: 2209-10.